I. The Codification Movement in Europe
The codification of private law from the late eighteenth century onwards is regarded, very widely, as a turning point in the development of private law in Europe. 1 Obviously, some of the more naive expectations entertained by intellectuals of the Age of Enlightenment have not been fulfilled: the codifications have neither made the learned lawyer redundant, nor have they led to a lasting consolidation (or ossification) of private law. They have, however, significantly contributed to the national fragmentation of the European legal tradition: for codification constitutes a piece of legislation which is applicable only within the confines of the territory for which the body responsible for legislation is competent to legislate. There had been signs of such fragmentation at the time of the usus modernus pandectarum in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the 'institutional' writers had no longer discussed Roman law as such but Roman-Dutch or Roman-Scots law, ius romano-hispanicum or ius romano-saxonicum.
2 But it had always been clear that these were merely regional or national variations of a common theme: different manifestations of one and the same legal tradition. With the enactment of the codifications this began to change. The awareness of a fundamental intellectual unity got lost and legal scholarship degenerated, in the much-quoted words of Rudolf von Jhering, to a national discipline the intellectual boundaries of which coincided with the political ones. 3 At the same time, the codifications brought to an end the 'second life' of Roman law, i.e. the story of its practical application in Europe. Since the days of the 'reception' Roman law had provided the basis for the administration of justice in western and central Europe and had become a ius commune, or common law. 4 In the process, it had been subject to considerable change; in particular, it had absorbed many elements of canon law, indigenous customary law, mercantile custom, and natural law theory. The usus antiquus of Roman law had thus been transformed into a usus modernus pandectarum 5 . Yet, a string of authors from François Hotman to Hermann Conring and Christian Thomasius had started to shake the authority of Roman law: of a law that had given rise to intricate doctrinal disputes, that was wedded to outdated and impracticable subtleties, and that had been enacted by the despotic rulers of past ages. Also, since Roman law was applicable only in subsidio, countless more specific territorial or local laws could govern a particular dispute. The great number and complexity of legal sources contributed to a widespread feeling of legal uncertainty and inefficiency as far as the administration of justice was An obvious paradox inherent in Savigny's programme that has repeatedly been noted consisted in the emphasis on Roman law as the basis for a contemporary theory of private law. It ill matched the idea of law as being the product of the spirit of the people (Volksgeist). The phenomenon of the 'reception' could only be explained in a very tortuous way on that basis. 27 A second problem arose from Savigny's partiality for the pure and undiluted Roman law, corresponding to the educational principles of contemporary humanism and the aesthetic ideas of classicism. 28 It entailed a somewhat disdainful attitude towards the immediately preceding period of the usus modernus pandectarum and a negative, and essentially unjust, evaluation of the work of the medieval Commentators whose mos italicus had paved the way for the usus modernus. This attitude was not easily reconcilable with a programme that was fundamentally based upon the notion of 'organic growth' and insisted on 'the even and dispassionate recognition of the value and individuality of every age'. 29 
IV. 'Historical Legal Science' and Codification
Moreover, there was, within the Historical School, an ambivalence towards the question of codification that was never quite resolved. The 'founding manifesto' 30 of the Historical School was Savigny's reply to A.F.J. Thibaut's call to end the intolerable and inconvenient diversity of private laws prevailing in Germany by adopting a General German Civil Code, modelled on the French Code civil. 31 In his famous essay entitled Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (Of the Vocation of our Time for Legislation and Legal Science) Savigny not only rejected the idea of a codification to be drafted and enacted hic et nunc, but criticized the very notion of a codification as inorganic, unscientific, arbitrary and hostile to tradition. At best, it was unnecessary; at worst it would distort and stifle 'organic' legal development. 32 None the less it was widely accepted, from about the middle of the nineteenth century that a codification of private law in Germany was about to come and was to end the direct application of Roman law. Theodor Mommsen in 1848 voiced the German nation's desire for the creation of a uniform and national law, 33 and Rudolf von Jhering predicted in 1852 that his own generation of lawyers would see the demise of Roman law in its present form. 34 The editorial of the first volume of the Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte (Journal of Legal History 1861), while professing to continue the plan and the aims of Savigny's Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft (Journal of Historical Legal Science) gave expression to the prevailing conviction that the historical development of the law could now sufficiently clearly be assessed 'for the results of the historical inquiry to be employed in the legislative process'. And even one of Savigny's most faithful disciples, who had sat at his feet in the University of Berlin and who had never ceased to see in him his own scholarly ideal, Bernhard Windscheid, 35 was among the most influential proponents of a German codification. Among the German lawyers, he wrote in 1878, 'there are probably relatively few who have not, with all the strength of soul available to them, yearned for the great work of a German code of private law', 36 Thus, it is small wonder that the codification's entry into force on the first day of the new century was greeted with strong feelings of national pride. 'The new century brings to fruition the greatest feat achieved in German legal life', as it was put in one of the two leading law Journals for practitioners, 37 while the other one, the Deutsche Juristenzeitung (German Lawyers' Journal) opened its January issue for the year 1900 with an ornamental page carrying the heading 'One People. One Empire. One Law'. For the first time, the notion of legal unity had become reality on German soil and for the first time, therefore, the energies of scholars and practitioners alike could focus on the interpretation of one and the same authoritative text.
V. Legal Unity by Way of Legislation
The way towards legal unity by means of a code of private law had been long and arduous. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the various states joined in the Deutscher Bund (German Federation) had already started to accommodate the needs of an expanding economy that was operating increasingly on a supraregional level. The advent of machinery and urbanization facilitated the production processes and the rising bourgeoisie favoured open markets promoting the free interplay of economic forces. Legal unification therefore was required, first and foremost, in the trade-related fields of law. A first significant step in this direction was the establishment of a German Customs Union in 1833. In 1848 the law of negotiable instruments was unified by means of the Allgemeine Deutsche Wechselordnung, 38 and between 1861 and 1866 nearly all the states of the Deutscher Bund adopted the draft of a General German Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch) that had been completed in 1861. 39 A draft law of obligations (Dresdener Entwurf) was published in 1865. Although it was never adopted, it significantly influenced the German Civil Code.
After the creation of the Deutsches Reich a streamlined procedural and organizational framework for the uniform and efficient administration of justice was established: the four Reichsjustizgesetze 40 concerned the unification of the court system (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), the law of bankruptcy (Konkursordnung), civil procedure (Zivilprozeßordnung), and criminal procedure (Strafprozeßordnung). They all came into force in October 1879. While they have been amended on various occasions, three of these acts remain upon the statute book today; the Konkursordnung was replaced by a new insolvency code (Insolvenzordnung) in 1999. The first of October 1879 also saw the opening of a supreme appeal court for the entire Reich in all civil and criminal matters: the Reichsgericht. 41 Its seat was Leipzig, a city with a distinguished legal tradition which had the advantage of not being identical with, but still sufficiently close to, the political capital of the Reich (Berlin). Its first president was Eduard von Simson, a Prussian lawyer of Jewish descent who had been baptized in his early youth. He had presided over the German National Assembly of 1848 that had met in the Frankfurt Paulskirche and had also been president of the Imperial Parliament. 42 The scene was thus set for what was to be the crowning symbol of German legal unity: a code of private law. Its gestation period was close to thirty years. The starting shot was fired by the lex Miquel Lasker of 1873, by means of which the power to legislate concerning the entire field of private law was conferred on the Imperial Parliament. The details of the way in which the BGB has been prepared have often been recounted: 43 appointment of a preliminary commission and, subsequently, of the First Commission, preparation of preliminary drafts by the reporters appointed for the five books of the projected code, publication of the First Draft with the attendant motivations (entitled Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich), vigorous and very controversial public debate, deliberations of an internal commission of the Imperial Department of Justice, appointment of the Second Commission, publication of the Second Draft, again with the attendant motivations (this time entitled Protokolle der Kommission für die Zweite Lesung des Entwurfs des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches), revision of the Second Draft by the Federal Council (Bundesrat), the debates in the Imperial Parliament (both in committee and in plenary sessions), the taking of the final vote (with the Social Democrats voting against the code because it did not deal with labour relations), promulgation in the Government Gazette of 1896, and entry into force a little less than three and a half years later, on 1 January 1900. In 1897 the librarian of the Reichsgericht, Georg Maas, published a little-known bibliography of the official documents relating to the Civil Code; 44 two years later a very useful collection of many important (though not, as was claimed in the title of the work, all) documents was edited by Benno Mugdan. 45 In the meantime, the genesis of each individual rule contained in the BGB has been traced and made available in an easilyaccessible manner by Horst Heinrich Jakobs and Werner Schubert. 46 In addition, Werner Schubert has organized a reprint of the preliminary drafts of the reporters appointed for the First Commission and their motivations. 47 They contain a wealth of comparative material and are an outstanding source for the state of contemporary doctrinal discussion.
The BGB was supposed to be, in Bernhard Windscheid's words, 'a cathedral of national splendour', 48 and Windscheid himself became one of its principal architects. Neither the design nor the details of its construction, however, could be taken to have been lifted from 'among the treasures deeply hidden in the people's soul'. 49 The general public in Germany has never developed any enthusiasm for the BGB, in spite (or, possibly because) of all of its technical qualities. And even among lawyers, the code was not universally greeted with feelings of elation or joy. The publication of the First Draft had initiated a persistent stream of criticism. 'A tornado broke loose. It rained, it poured books and pamphlets… The project was criticized from every point of view… One might have thought that the whole scheme would perish': thus Maitland, from the perspective of a foreign observer. 50 This criticism was taken into account only to a limited extent. Eventually, German lawyers began to resign themselves to the idea that perhaps too much had been expected of the Civil Code.
VI. The BGB as a 'Prison Cell'?
At the same time, there had also been widespread feelings of apprehension in the years before 1900 as to how the codification would influence the administration of justice. 51 Many lawyers realized that, in view of the special nature of the Roman legal sources, they had enjoyed a great degree of freedom. The richness and complexity of those sources had allowed wide scope for doctrinal development and innovation, and the pandectist scholars had thereby become the high priests of legal scholarship. 52 The new code, it was feared, would reduce the judge to a mere 'subsumption machine' (Subsumtionsautomat), 53 and would constitute a prison cell for legal scholarship. 54 There was great concern about an impending 'cult of literalism'. 55 These anxieties prompted some authors to attribute to the BGB merely the status of a 'restatement'; 56 they stimulated renewed attempts to search for criteria of justice beyond the positive law; 57 and they contributed substantially to the rise of the 'free-law movement' (Freirechtsschule). 58 Looking at the way in which private law developed in the course of the twentieth century it appears that the BGB did in fact prove to be a kind of prison cell in one respect. For, while the draftsmen of the code had still based their proposals on remarkably comprehensive comparative legal research, 59 private law legislation in the new century in the words of Ernst Rabel, became enamoured with the example of the Great Wall of China. 60 A similar observation could be made as far as legal doctrine and the study of law are concerned. By the time the BGB entered into force, an avalanche of legal literature had started to sweep across the German legal landscape. 61 Textbooks 62 and commentaries 63 on the BGB had been appearing since as early as 1897. In 1899 a bibliography was published that listed approximately 4,000 titles of over 324 pages.
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This literature, however, was almost exclusively exegetical in character, focused on the wording of the Statute. 65 Many authors at first did hardly more than paraphrase the statutory provisions. They waited to see how these provisions would be applied in practice 66 and then began to integrate the rapidly emerging case law into the new editions of their works.
Thus, very soon, the letter of the law was filled with life. At first glimpse, at least, it appeared to be a new and youthful life. Since the codification, according to contemporary opinion, contained a comprehensive and closed system of legal rules, 67 it constituted an autonomous interpretational space. Thus, on the one hand, 'the recollection of pandectist scholarship, one of the supreme achievements of the German legal mind', 68 faded remarkably quickly from both the doctrine and the practice of German law; Savigny, Dernburg, Jhering, Windscheid, and many other of the leading authors of the nineteenth century were hardly cited any longer, not to mention the earlier literature of the ius commune or the Roman legal sources themselves. The 'historical' interpretation was largely reduced to a perusal of the materials and motivations produced by the draftsmen of the code. 69 Of considerable significance, in that respect, had been the decision of the German law teachers in 1896, at a Conference in Eisenach, to assign to the BGB the central position in the law curriculum; this was quite contrary to the way in which the codifications prevailing in parts of nineteenth-century Germany had been treated. 70 On the other hand, everything which lay outside the territorial scope of application of the national codification also vanished from the intellectual horizon of legal academics and practitioners. German law was to be understood and developed from within itself: Italian and French legal literature, let alone English case law, could contribute nothing to it. The codification thus promoted not only a vertical, but also a horizontal, isolation of legal scholarship. '[I] simply do not believe that contemporary law has really grown from the old law, but I regard it as something new, created by the need of the present day and the sovereign will of the modern legislature', wrote Konrad Cosack, the author of a modern textbook, 71 and he therefore refused to develop the law historically. At the same time, the organic point of departure for the incorporation of comparative law was lost. The legal horizon was limited by the rules and principles contained in the BGB. Within this framework, judges and legal writers strove to determine 'the concept' of impossibility 72 to distinguish the different types of damage that can arise as a result of the delivery of non-conforming objects, 73 or to penetrate the labyrinth of the 'owner-possessor-relationship'. 74 According to prevailing, contemporary ideology the codification represented the turning point of German legal history.
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VII. The Reaction of the Courts
And the courts? Even in the course of the nineteenth-century legal practice had not conformed to the ideas usually associated with the terms 'conceptual jurisprudence' and 'scholarly positivism'. Selfconfident courts like the Supreme Appeal Courts of Kassel, Jena, or Munich, the Supreme Appeal Court of the four free cities in Lübeck, the Prussian Supreme Court, or later the Imperial Supreme Court in Commercial Matters and, from 1879, the Imperial Supreme Court, were able without any difficulty to procure for themselves 'the freedom of movement which is so indispensable for a judge' (and which was indeed conceded to them by clear-sighted authors like Windscheid). 76 An example can perhaps illustrate this assertion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Gustav Hugo had stated very pointedly that Aquilian liability could, essentially, be reduced to the principle: whoever unlawfully injures another is bound to pay compensation. This assertion, he added, gave offence to 'the exact scholars' and was, therefore, not to be found in any of the textbooks, even although it correctly reflected the practice of nearly all courts in Germany. 77 But it was quite in tune with the tradition of the ius commune 78 and was to lead, in the course of the following decades, to decisions where compensation was granted for pure economic loss. 79 Essentially, therefore, the lex Aquilia was applied in a very similar way as the famous general provision of delictual liability in French law (Article 1382 Code civil) was interpreted by the courts. 80 There were many other developments which an 'exact scholar' must have observed with alarm. Thus, as far as liability among neighbours was concerned, pandectist legal literature tended to insist on fault. 81 At the same time, however, the courts displayed a remarkable willingness to abandon the axiomatic fixation on the culpa requirement as a Foundation for extracontractual liability. When, from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, industrialization led to a significant increase in neighbour disputes, they realized that an owner of property has to be granted protection, at least in some situations, even beyond the general principles of Aquilian liability. The actio negatoria was among the remedies liberally extended in this context. 82 The possibility of sanctioning wrongs by means of private law had vanished from legal practice long before it had vanished from the textbooks. 83 And that an owner has to make sure that his property does not constitute a danger to the public was recognized long before the concept of Verkehrssicherungspflicht had found its way into legal literature. 84 Many more examples could presumably be found by closely analysing nineteenth-century court practice. The Imperial Supreme Court in Commercial Matters displayed a great deal of creativity in the nine years of its existence, and in the reasons for its decisions it relied surprisingly often on comparative observations. 85 The Reichsgericht interpreted the codes and statutes which it had to apply not in a literalist manner but in the spirit of the historical school, i.e. with reference to the general thinking patterns of pandectist legal scholarship. 86 This comparatively flexible approach towards the applicable sources of law did not significantly change after the enactment of the BGB. For, contrary to a widely held opinion, the first decades of the twentieth century were not marked by conceptual jurisprudence, statutory positivism, and the fine art of the 'legal game of chess'. 87 Thus, for example, the Reichsgericht continued to apply the exceptio doli in the tradition of the ius commune; 88 soon after 1900, it began, from a number of different starting points, to turn the decision of the draftsmen of the BGB not to recognize the doctrines of culpa in contrahendo 89 and clausula rebus sic stantibus 90 on its head; it granted claims arising from positive malperformance (positive Forderungsverletzung) of contracts of sale based on § 276 I 1 BGB in exactly the same way as it had previously done on the basis of the actio empti of the ius commune; 91 it recognized a right to terminate the contract even in these cases of contractual liability; 92 the judges of the Imperial period had already laid the foundations for the recognition of a contract with protective effect vis-à-vis third parties and the doctrine of transferred loss (Drittschadensliquidation); 93 they set in motion the process of a transformation of the law of delict, 94 which was later analysed in a famous article by Ernst von Caemmerer; 95 they established the essential contours of the law of agency as it is practised today, 96 and they determined the boundary between liability for latent defects and the law of mistake 97 which was to hold for the rest of the century. Here, too, many other examples could be given. Where the Reichsgericht developed the law, there are usually either overt or covert lines of continuity linking the new law to the old: either because the judges simply perpetuated their earlier case law, or because they extended a line of development which had its origin in the nineteenth century. Except in the ideology of most law teachers, the BGB was certainly not a watershed in German legal development; indeed, rather it bore certain characteristics of a restatement 98 while, at the same time, settling a number of deeply-rooted doctrinal disputes. 99 Or, as Bernhard Windscheid wrote in an article in which he attempted, for himself, to resolve the tension between the programme of the Historical School and the impending codification of German private law, or between legal science and legislation: 'As historical jurists we know that the code will be no more than a moment in the development, more tangible, certainly, than the ripple in a stream but, none the less, merely a ripple in the stream'. 100 The great achievement of the Reichsgericht lay in the fact that, from the outset, it cautiously developed the law and adapted it to new and changing circumstances while generally avoiding any break in continuity. Among the tools used by the judges were the undisguised appeal to general legal intuition 101 or common sense, 102 the reading of tacit conditions into the contract (a device which has been popular at all times and in many countries), 103 and the construction of fictitious contracts. 104 And in order to satisfy, at least formally, the demands of statutory positivism, even the legislative history was occasionally subjected to a somewhat skewed perspective determined, above all, by the desired result. 105 
VIII. Unity of the System of Private Law?
'But nothing is more certain than that the old society and economic system has irretrievably come to an end' (Thomas Mann in his diary, 15 April 1919). That collapse resulted from the First World War and the upheavals caused by it. At the same time, our perception of the world changed dramatically. 'The modern world began on 29 May 1919', writes Paul Johnson, 106 'when photographs of a solar eclipse, taken on the Island of Principe off West Africa and at Sobral in Brazil, confirmed the truth of a new theory of the universe'. Obviously, the nineteenth century only really ended at around 1920. Thus, unlike the Code civil, the BGB did not herald the beginning of the new epoch. In many respects, it still reflected the values of a world that was destined to disappear. 107 It was a world with a patriarchal family structure, with associations and foundations still firmly under the tutelage of state authorities, 108 and with a comparatively formal concept of freedom of contract; 109 a world in which a regulation on bee swarms was regarded as more important than one on standard terms of business. The typical citizen for the BGB was not the factory worker but rather the moneyed entrepreneur, the landed proprietor, or the public servant. 110 In a number of respects, therefore, the BGB was soon to be regarded as outdated. About 160 statutory amendments and decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court have affected both the text and substance of the code, more than half of them, however, dating from the last quarter of the twentieth century. Family law, in particular, has been subject to fundamental changes; more than thirty important amendments have left hardly any part of it unchanged. 111 Comparatively few changes have been made to text of the other four books. The provisions on lease and employment contracts have been considerably modified and supplemented, but the development of the law of domestic leases 112 has largely, and that of labour relations 113 has completely, taken place outside the framework of the BGB. Other major amendments concern the regulation of contracts relating to package holidays in § § 651 a ff., the law of land tenure ( § § 585 ff. BGB) and contracts concerning bank transfers, bank payments, and giro accounts ( § § 676 a ff.). 114 Outside the BGB, however, a secondary system of private law by way of special statutes' 115 has grown up, by means of which the social model underlying the BGB has been adapted to modern conditions. Apart from competition law and labour law, the law of consumer protection deserves particular mention in this context. Among its core components are the statutes on standard terms of business (1976), doorstep sales and similar transactions (1986), and on consumer credits (1990) , but also other statutes like the ones dealing with liability for defective products (1989), time-share agreements (1996) and distance sales (2000). It is often overlooked 116 that this tradition of excluding from the general private law codification subjects which are considered to be of a special nature dates back to the Historical School and that therefore neither the statute concerning instalment sales (1894) nor the one imposing strict liability for personal injuries sustained in the operation of a railway (1871) were included in the code. 117 It has, in fact, remained controversial until today whether, or to what extent, such subjects have attained the kind of structural and conceptual stability required for incorporation into a general code of private law.
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IX. The Resilience of the BGB
With the Modernization of the Law of Obligations Act, most of the special statutes in the field of consumer contract law have now found a place in the BGB. In addition, there have been reforms affecting the law of damages, 119 contract of lease, 120 form requirements, 121 package holidays, 122 and foundations. 123 The introduction of same sex partnerships by an act of 16 February 2001 124 has led to more than thirty provisions throughout the BGB being amended. All these changes, however, have happened in the course of the past four years. Up to that time, i.e. for the first one hundred years of its existence, the text of the BGB (apart from the provisions on family law) had been remarkably resistant to change. This resilience throughout all the upheavals of the twentieth century has frequently been commented upon. It is less remarkable for property law, the law of succession, and even for delict or unjustified enrichment, than it is for an inherently dynamic subject such as contract law. The 'evacuation of important developments (labour law, social lease law, consumer law) provides only part of the explanation. Another reason for the BGB's resilience lies in the character of the code itself. In form and substance it was moulded by nineteenth-century pandectist scholarship. Its draftsmen had, very largely, aimed at setting out, containing, and consolidating 'the legal achievements of centuries'. 125 The BGB was regarded as part of a tradition significantly shaped by legal scholarship. The phenomenon of scholarly 'development' of the law was quite familiar to the draftsmen of the code. Horst Heinrich Jakobs has, therefore, pointedly referred to the BGB as a codification 'which does not contain the source of law in itself but has its source in the legal scholarship from which it was created'. 126 The BGB was designed to provide a framework for an 'organically progressive legal science'. The idea of enacting a prohibition of commenting upon the BGB (as existed with regard to the Prussian Code of 1794) 127 was quite alien to the draftsmen of the BGB: as alien as the equally odd idea that it might be possible to lay down a specific rule for every imaginable situation. Time and again, the travaux preparatoires contain express statements to the effect that the solution to a specific problem has to be left to legal scholarship.
Moreover, in spite of having been influenced so strongly by pandectist legal doctrine, the BGB is not doctrinaire in spirit and outlook. 128 Its draftsmen did not feel called upon to provide authoritative definitions for fundamental concepts such as contract, declaration of will, damages, causation, or unlawfulness and thus, in a way, to remove these matters from scholarly discussion. Nor did they determine questions of legal construction (what type of legal act is the performance of an obligation?). A number of basic evaluations and doctrinal points of departure were also not specifically spelt out in the code in view of the fact that they could be taken for granted. Thus, for example, there is no explicit reference to freedom of contract. § 119 BGB envisages three different types of mistake which allow a contract to be rescinded; but the intellectual basis for this rule, i.e. that an error in motive is irrelevant in principle, is not mentioned in the code. The BGB sometimes provides hardly more than the conceptual signposts for the development of legal doctrine. The rules contained in it usually attain a considerable level of abstraction, both as far as form and substance are concerned. Contrary to the Prussian Code ('Common chicken, geese, ducks, doves and turkeys are to be counted among the chattels appurtenant to a landed estate') 129 the BGB predominantly does not attempt to provide a careful and detailed regulation of individual situations to be encountered in daily life, but instead makes available a set of rules and concepts which are applicable to a large variety of problems -among them many that could not be envisaged by those who drafted the code. It is hardly surprising that the BGB has come to be regarded as outdated wherever this technique has not been followed and where the code, therefore, confronts its readers with the world of day labourers and coach drivers, 130 or with the merger of migrating bee swarms. 131 In addition, of course, there are openended provisions like § 138 I BGB (invalidity of contracts contra bonos mores) or § 242 BGB (obligations must be performed in accordance with the precepts of good faith) 132 by means of which the BGB attempts to achieve a balance between doctrinal stability and flexibility.
X. The Development of Private Law under the Code
The foundation was thus laid for courts of law and legal scholarship, in characteristic cooperation, to bring the letters of the law to life, to interpret and develop the provisions contained in the code, and to adapt them to new circumstances. 133 The details of this process are analysed in a new, historical commentary on the German Civil Code. 134 A suitable methodological background was provided by the interest-based approach which was established by Philipp Heck but can ultimately be traced back to Rudolf von Jhering. 135 After 1945, the focus on interests was substituted by an emphasis on the balancing of evaluations. 136 Courts and legal writers attempted to tackle the problems arising from awkwardly formulated, or idiosyncratic, provisions, from a lack of systematic coordination (the relationship between the rules on unjustified enrichment and those on so-called owner-possessor relationships), from individual rules which soon turned out to be unsuitable (the six-month prescription period, running from the moment of delivery for claims based on latent defects in contracts of sale), or from the fact that the scope of application of a provision came to be seen as too narrow (the in pari turpitudine rule, as contained in § 817, 2 BGB) or too wide (mortuus redhibetur, as adopted in § 350 BGB). 'Gaps in the law' 137 had to be filled, drafting mistakes had to be corrected, and indeterminate legal concepts had to be specified. Legal solutions had to be found, on the basis of the considerations underlying the regulations in the code, for complex patterns of facts (the various categories of three-party situations in the law of unjustified enrichment). New legal questions, not even imaginable at the beginning of the twentieth century, had to be solved (wrongful birth). New types of contracts which came to be established in business life (such as leasing), had to be brought within the system of contracts provided by the BGB. Changes in social mores had to be accommodated, such as the commercialization of ever increasing aspects of life, including holidays and leisure time. The law of damages and of unjustified enrichment, as well as other areas, where the BGB contains hardly more than a number of general concepts and provisions, had to be filled with finely nuanced rules and doctrines.
Spacious doctrinal edifices have been created even where the BGB contains hardly more than individual building blocks (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage). Some of these doctrines have been developed in spite of the fact that there does not really exist a 'legal gap' in the BGB, others have been smuggled into the code along side-paths which had not been designed for that purpose (the right to an established and operative business). New systematic schemes have been devised (enrichment by transfer, enrichment based on an encroachment) and new theoretical frameworks came to be established (liability based on reasonable expectations). The 'materialization' of German contract law was evident not only in acts of special legislation outside the BGB -such as the Standard Terms of Business Act, or the rights of revocation contained in a number of consumer protection statutes -but also in the way in which rules like § 138 I BGB came to be applied, for instance, to instalment credit transactions, or to contracts of suretyship entered into by an impecunious wife or child of the main debtor, or in the scope of application given to a doctrine such as culpa in contrahendo. 138 The openness and flexibility of the Generalklauseln turned out to be a curse under the National Socialist regime, and a blessing under the Basic Law of 1949. The doctrine of the indirectly horizontal effect 139 led to German law being adjusted to the system of values embodied in the fundamental rights provisions of the Basic Law; but it also increasingly placed the Federal Constitutional Court in the position of an irregular supreme court of appeal in private law disputes. 140 Occasionally even decisions by the Federal Supreme Court which were clearly contra legem have been sanctioned by the Federal Constitutional Court in view of certain evaluations derived from the Basic Law. 141 The American comparative lawyer John P. Dawson has famously referred to a German 'case law revolution'. 142 A large number of 'legal discoveries' 143 has been made. Much of what has been discovered is new. But often we also find old wine being poured into new vessels. This is true wherever the rules of the BGB constitute pandectist doctrine in statutory form, where we are dealing with rules of interpretation such as theinterpretatio contra eum qui clarius loqui debuisset, or with general maxims underlying the BGB without specifically having been restated in the code (dolo agit qui petit quod statim redditurus est). Wherever a problem has not been decided by the draftsmen of the code but has been left to legal doctrine, the pandectist textbooks also, not rarely, point the way towards the most appropriate solution. We observe the phenomenon of a renaissance of rules and concepts from an ostensibly outdated past (utile per inutile non vitiatur), 144 recourse to the sources of the ius communecontinues to be of considerable significance for the proper evaluation and interpretation of the provisions contained in the BGB. Ulrich Huber's great monograph on the law of breach of contract 145 can serve as a particularly impressive, as well as comparatively recent, confirmation for the truth of this assertion.
XI. Criticism of the BGB
For more than one hundred years, the BGB has been both a characteristic manifestation and a constituent feature of German legal culture. It has been, and has remained, modern as a result of having provided a framework for an organic development of the law. None the less, there has also always been criticism. This tradition goes back to the period immediately after the publication of the First Draft in 1888. Protagonists of a fundamental line of criticism were then, in particular, the members of the women's movement, the socialists, and the legal Germanists; they regarded the code as patriarchal, insensitive to social issues, not readily comprehensible, and too pervasively Romanist in spirit, form, and substance. 146 Dieter Schwab has recently demonstrated that such criticism continued after the BGB's entry into force and that it was, above all, taken up with renewed vigour in times of upheaval. 147 Thus in 1919, as Otto von Gierke had done around the turn of the new century Justus Wilhelm Hedemann pointed out the BGB's lack of character: 'It is timid and dull, it displays no vigorous spirit, no characteristic personality'. 148 It was oriented towards the conservative and prosperous citizen. This was also disliked by the BGB's critics during the time of National Socialism. The code was thought to be characterized by an exaggerated individualism and to reflect a materialistic world order, it was regarded as 'un-German', removed from the reality of life, and scholastic. The longing for a law that was 'German' now became mixed up with racist ideology. 149 The completion of a 'People's Code', prepared under the auspices of an Academy for German Law by the elite of professors of private law, as far as they were still active in German universities, 150 was prevented by the collapse of the regime. The workers' and farmers' paradise of post-war East Germany found the BGB no more appealing than the Nazi state. In 1965 a family law code was enacted and, in 1976, those parts of the BGB that had still been in force until then were replaced by a socialist civil code. In West Germany, the so-called student revolts from 1967 onwards revived the aversion to the BGB: it was of no use for regulating the 'social processes of our time'. 151 The ideological bias of a large part of the fundamentalist opposition to the BGB should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the code has never engendered feelings of affection. Nor has it become a popular part of the German cultural heritage, and it has no share in the creation of a national identity comparable to that of the Code civil in France, or the common law in England. Most German lawyers, in the words of Hein Kotz, pay their code 'a kind of cool, almost grudging tribute'. 152 Thus, it is hardly surprising that the code's 100th birthday passed without great celebration by either the general public or the legal community. In 1996 and 2000, a number of articles appeared attempting to provide a detached assessment, 153 an occasional colloquium was held, 154 and here and there a series of lectures was organized. 155 No Festschrift was dedicated to the BGB (quite in contrast, incidentally, to the Federal Supreme Court on the occasion of its 50th birthday, celebrated also in 2000). 156 The general tone of the centenary contributions was not exuberant. The technical quality of the code was praised, as ever, as were its intellectual maturity and the fine sense of legislative self-restraint. German lawyers appreciate the BGB as a stable basis for their work. In other countries, it has always been regarded as a typical product of German legal scholarship ('Never, I should think, has so much first-rate brain power been put into an act of legislation': F.W. Maitland);
157 not surprisingly therefore, it has had a greater impact on legal theory and legal doctrine in other European countries than on foreign legislation. 158 Still, however, it was received in Greece (with the result that that country is, today, normally regarded as part of the Germanic legal family); it shaped the reform of the Austrian Civil Code in 1914-16; and it influenced the codifications in Italy (1942), Portugal (1966) , and the Netherlands (1992). In discussions concerning law reform in the formerly socialist countries and the harmonization of private law in Europe, however, the BGB has often been regarded as outdated. This is, as far as contract law is concerned, largely due to the fact that the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods has established itself as a more suitable model. Also, a number of the relevant doctrines have been raised by the BGB to a level of abstraction unfamiliar to most lawyers outside Germany: for they are dealt with in the General Part of the BGB, not just the general part of the law of obligations, or of contract law.
Also, of course, it has to be acknowledged that the BGB did in fact contain a number of key provisions that were increasingly regarded as deeply unsatisfactory. They include, as far as the law of obligations is concerned, delictual liability for others in terms of § 831, which is still based on the fault principle in spite of a reversal of the onus of proof, the restrictive attitude with regard to granting compensation for immaterial damage ( § § 847 and 253 BGB), the excessively differentiated law of extinctive prescription, the outdated system of liability for latent defects in relation to contracts of sale and contracts for work, and the badly coordinated restitution regimes contained in § § 346 ff. and 812 ff. BGB respectively. In one of these cases, the Federal Supreme Court (with the approval of the Federal Constitutional Court) 159 has gone so far as partially to derogate the relevant rule ( § 253 BGB); 160 in another ( § 831 BGB), the courts have attempted to provide workable solutions by extending the regime provided in § 31 BGB 161 and by opening up a wide grey area between delict and contract which they have subjected to the contractual regime; 162 in the other cases they have explored a multitude of subtle ways to get around the problem but have, at the same time, frequently created new difficulties of delimitation or conflicts in evaluation. In the area of liability for latent defects contractual practice has, of course, also helped to find appropriate solutions. The Ministry of Justice intended to deal with two of the problem areas mentioned above and therefore, in 1967, published a draft statute for the amendment and supplementation of provisions dealing with the law of damages. These proposed reforms have, however, never been implemented.
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XII. The Modernization of the Law of Obligations
The idea of a comprehensive reform of the law of obligations seems to be attributable to the then Minister of Justice, Hans-Jochen Vogel. He first presented it to the Federal Parliament in 1978 and subsequently also to the 52nd Deutscher Juristentag (Meeting of the Association of German Lawyers). 164 The main concerns motivating the reform were (i) the integration of a number of special statutes into the BGB (such as, for example, the Standard Terms of Business Act, the Act on Instalment Sales, and several strict liability statutes), (ii) the incorporation of new types of contractual relationships into the BGB (such as doctors' contracts, contracts concluded with old-age and nursing homes, contracts about the supply of energy, and contracts between private clients and their banks), (iii) the reform of a number of specific types of obligations already dealt with in the BGB (sale, contracts for work, the law of unjustified enrichment, delict), and (iv) the need for reshaping the general law of obligations, particularly for adapting it to new developments on the international level. 165 The Ministry then requested a number of academic opinions, which were published in three large volumes in 1981 and 1983. 166 Each of the reporters had the task of investigating an area of the law of obligations with a view to its need for reform, and of formulating suggestions as to how such reform might be implemented. Almost all areas within the law of obligations were included, 167 with the important exception of the law of lease. 168 The reports were eagerly discussed, both among academics and the various legal professions; 169 thus, for instance, at the beginning of 1983, the Association of Teachers of Private Law devoted a special Conference to the reform of the law of obligations. 170 A report on the discussion following the introductory keynote speech 171 referred to a mood of 'sceptical open-mindedness'. 172 One year later, the Federal Minister of Justice established a Reform Commission 173 headed by the responsible DirectorGeneral; it consisted of four delegates from the justice departments of the federal states, five judges, one practising lawyer, one notary, and four professors (Uwe Diederichsen, Hein Kotz, Dieter Medicus, and Peter Schlechtriem). 174 The problem areas to be dealt with by the Commission were now limited to the law of breach of contract, liability for defects in contracts of sale and contracts for work, and liberative prescription. The Commission was charged with the task of reshaping the law so as to be clearer and 'more in keeping with the times', 175 taking account of the way in which the law had developed in practice. Twenty two meetings were held, each of several days' duration; in 1992, the Commission presented its final report. 176 In addition to a general section, that report contained specific proposals for legislation in each of the areas mentioned, as well as the reasoning behind these proposals. As far as the general law of breach of contract is concerned, the Commission followed the lead of the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in many respects. This was entirely in accordance with the views of the initial reporter on this subject, Professor Ulrich Huber of the University of Bonn, who had answered the question: 'Is the introduction of a law of breach modelled on the Uniform Sales Law to be recommended?' in the affirmative (though he had still taken his lead from the Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods of 17 July 1973). 177 At the 60th Deutscher Juristentag in September 1994, the Commission's draft proposals were the subject of the deliberations of the private law section. 178 In spite of occasional fundamental criticism by distinguished academics, 179 and outright rejection of the draft by representatives of commerce and industry, the general sentiment towards the draft was favourable. The report summing up the proceedings of the Deutscher Juristentag in one of the two major general law reviews recorded 'an encouraging result' and appealed to the Government finally to put its words into action; 180 another reporter commented on a discussion that had gone much more smoothly than most participants would have expected.
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According to Ernst A. Kramer, 182 the discussion displayed 'a fundamentally positive attitude', which also manifested itself in the results of various votes taken at the meeting; by and large they were very heartening' for the Commission. 183 Apart from that, however, there was no broadly-based discussion of the draft, either before or after the Juristentag in Münster. 184 This was due to an increasingly widespread impression that the draft had disappeared into a drawer in the Ministry of Justice and that its implementation was no longer likely to happen. The excitement associated with an impending reform made way for a general sentiment of indifference. This ended in September 2000 when suddenly something like a bombshell was dropped on the German legal community: the publication of a 630-page 'Discussion Draft' of a statute modernizing the law of obligations. 185 The direct trigger for the Discussion Draft was the enactment of the Consumer Sales Directive and the need for its implementation by 1 January 2002. There can be no doubt that this Directive could have been implemented by effecting a number of comparatively marginal adjustments to German sales law. 186 The Government had, however, decided to use this opportunity finally to carry out the long-postponed reform of the law of obligations. As a result, the entire project was now placed under an enormous pressure of time. This was highly problematic in view of the fact that the Discussion Draft (i) extended the reform agenda that had previously come to be accepted (in particular, it was now proposed to incorporate a number of special statutes concerning consumer protection into the BGB), (ii) even in so far as it dealt with subjects covered by the Draft of the Reform Commission, sometimes significantly deviated from that Draft (particularly concerning the law of prescription), and (iii) had not been brought up to date even where it followed the recommendations of that Commission; thus, it failed to take account of recent international initiatives in contract law (the publication of the Principles of European Contract Law and of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts) 187 and of new studies fundamentally affecting our perception of German contract law. 188 Academic criticism was not, therefore, long in coming. It was articulated particularly strongly at a Symposium of German professors in private law held at the University of Regensburg in November 2000. 189 It induced the Government to establish two working groups charged with the task of critically examining the Discussion Draft and the recommendations contained in it. The working group concerning breach of contract consisted mainly of professors; 190 the one looking into the law of prescription, sales law, and other matters was constituted by officials from the Ministries of Justice of the various German Länder, judges of the Federal Supreme Court, members of the earlier Reform Commission, practitioners, and one professorial representative. 191 These working groups only had a period of about two months for their deliberations. None the less, they managed to effect a number of substantial changes. In early May 2001 a Government Draft was published which very largely accepted the recommendations of the working groups but also took account of suggestions and requests which had emerged in the course of hearings of interest groups affected by the reform. 192 In the course of summer and autumn 2001 the Government Draft was pushed through Parliament by way of an accelerated procedure. In the process, it was again repeatedly changed. 193 The Modernization of the German Law of Obligations Act was finally approved by the Federal Parliament in October and by the Council of State Governments in early November 2001, and it was promulgated on 26 November 2001. A little more than five weeks later it entered into force.
The reform legislation has divided the German private law professoriate in an unprecedented manner. Strong language has been used to scold the intellectual immaturity of the new law, and the finger of scorn has been pointed at many of its aspects. Others have emphasized the Government's readiness to listen to academic criticism, to involve leading legal academics in the process of revising the Discussion Draft, and to follow many of their suggestions. In the meantime, German lawyers have had to come to terms with the reform, however critically it may have to be evaluated. 194 An enormous amount of legal literature has appeared, whether in the form of textbooks, commentaries, or even articles. It continues to grow with frightening rapidity. Much more than has hitherto been the case German authors will, however, have to cease to look at German law in isolation. They will have to take account of, and at the same time contribute to, what must be considered to be one of the most important legal developments of our time: the increasing Europeanization of private law.
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XIII. The Europeanization of Private Law
From about the mid-1980s, the European Communities began to enact Directives which profoundly affect core areas of the national systems of private law. 196 Milestones of this development were the Directives concerning liability for defective products, contracts negotiated away from Business premises, consumer credit, package travel, unfair terms in consumer contracts, and consumer sales. 197 As a result, the requirement of interpreting provisions of national law in conformity with the Directives on which they are based has attained considerable practical importance. 198 In addition, the European Court of Justice, though not a Supreme Court for private law disputes in the European Union, has started to fashion concepts, rules, and principles which are relevant not only for the law of the Union but also for the private laws of its Member States. 199 Several international commissions and groups of experts are busy developing or 'finding' (by means of a type of restatement) common principles of a European law of contract, torts, or even trusts or family law. 200 Ambitious research projects strive to establish the 'common core' of European private law. 201 The codification of European private law has been championed, consistently, by the European Parliament, first in a resolution of May 1989. 202 The Commission of the European Union has, more cautiously, issued an action plan for a more coherent European contract law 203 which, inter alia, aims at the development of a 'common frame of reference'. This frame of reference is supposed to provide the basis for further deliberations on an optional instrument in the field of European contract law. 204 The Principles of European Contract Law, drawn up by the so-called 'Lando Commission' 205 constitute a blueprint for such instrument. Among academics across Europe the desirability of a European Civil Code has become a hotly contested issue. 206 Two international initiatives have already embarked on an attempt to devise draft codes for the field of contract law and beyond. 207 In legal education, too, there are signs of a change of perspective. 208 The mobility of law students within the European Union is promoted by the extraordinarily successful Erasmus (now Socrates) Programme. More and more law faculties are trying to give themselves a 'European' profile by offering integrated study programmes. Institutes and chairs of European private law, European business law, or European legal history have been established. Models of legal harmonization from Europe's past 209 and from other parts of the world 210 are receiving increasing attention. Moreover, the national isolation of law and legal scholarship is being overcome by the uniform private law laid down in international conventions. Of central importance, in this respect, is the success story of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which is beginning to play an increasingly important role in private law adjudications by national Supreme Courts. 211 The development sketched, so far, in the roughest outline is also reflected in the emergence of a legal literature focusing on European, rather than merely national, law. This began in the fields of comparative law and legal history. 212 Since then, we have seen the publication of a textbook on the European law of contract, 213 delict, and unjustified enrichment, 214 of comparative casebooks, 215 of series of monographs dealing with European legal history and European private law, of at least three legal Journals which are devoted to European private law, 216 and of collections of the foundational texts in the field. 217 At the same time it is clear that we will still be faced, in the foreseeable future, with the co existence of a great number of national systems of private law in Europe. Much would, however, be gained, if these could be assimilated gradually, or organically. This requires the protagonists of national legal development to be aware of what happens in the other national legal systems and on the European level, critically to examine quirks and idiosyncracies of their own legal systems, and to adopt, whenever possible, a harmonizing approach. 218 Those responsible for determining the direction of European private law, on the other hand, have to take account of the national legal experiences which have been gathered by sophisticated courts and legal writers.
It is in this spirit that the studies collected in the present volume attempt to assess the recent reform of German contract law. 
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